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Homebuyer Beware 
MERS AND THE LAW OF SUBSEQUENT 
PURCHASERS 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are in the market for a new home. You 
scour local real estate listings, you vet real estate agents, and 
you canvas neighborhoods until finally a property grabs your 
attention. You know this is where you will spend the rest of 
your life. So you make the homeowner an offer, he accepts, and 
you proceed to the closing. Lawyers, real estate agents, and 
title insurers all gather around a table. Everything appears to 
be going smoothly: you distribute your purchase funds to the 
seller, he pays his remaining balance on the mortgage, and the 
owner of his mortgage—a company named Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS)—discharges the mortgage 
and removes its lien on the property. Because your title search 
revealed that MERS possessed the only outstanding interest 
against the property, you are satisfied that the title is free from 
adverse claims. Accordingly, you close the deal. 
Six months pass. You have finally finished moving into 
your new home. You have met your new neighbors, found a 
new favorite restaurant, and enrolled your children into a new 
school. Moreover, your finances have remained stable, and you 
are current on your mortgage payments. As a result, you are 
perplexed when you return home one day to an unwelcome 
surprise: a foreclosure notice. You immediately call your bank 
in protest, but the bank actually confirms its receipt of your 
mortgage payments. In fact, the foreclosure notice is not even 
from your lender.  
You hire a lawyer to represent you, but to no avail. The 
law is not on your side. Although you performed a title search 
and found only MERS’s name in the land records, another 
unrecorded claim existed. As it turns out, MERS held only 
“legal title” to the property, while another party actually owned 
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the right to the mortgage payments.1 Accordingly, after the 
seller tendered the remaining balance to MERS, the company 
encountered a problem when it could not determine who was 
entitled to the funds. MERS later distributed the funds to the 
wrong individual. As a result, the true owner retains a claim 
against the underlying property. You lose your dream home. 
Worse still, you may not be alone.  
Subsequent purchasers of MERS-mortgaged properties 
throughout the nation may find themselves in similar danger. 
MERS is listed on more than 65 million mortgages,2 or 
“approximately 60% of all mortgage loans in the United 
States.”3 Moreover, due to documentation errors4 and “shoddy 
recordkeeping practices,”5 the likelihood that MERS cannot 
identify the true owner of a particular mortgage note is quite 
substantial.6 This generates tremendous risks for subsequent 
purchasers. For example, under New York law, a discharge of 
the mortgage without a corresponding discharge of the 
mortgage note remains ineffective as against the owner of the 
note.7 Therefore, when MERS discharges a mortgage without 
knowledge of the note owner’s identity and later distributes 
funds to the wrong MERS member, the owner of the note can 
  
 1 Sample MOM Mortgage, MERS, at 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.mersinc.org/MersProducts/forms.aspx?mpid=1 (follow “Sample Mortgage” 
hyperlink) (“Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the 
interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument . . . .”).  
 2 Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, In Middle of Foreclosure Chaos, Local 
Firms Keep Popping Up, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/07/AR2010100706667.html [hereinafter Dennis & Cha, 
Foreclosure Chaos].  
 3 Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 539 (App. Div. 2011). 
 4 See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: 
EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 
AND FORECLOSURE MITIGATION 48 n.171 (2010) (“[A]buses include misapplying payments, 
force-placing insurance improperly, disregarding requirements to evaluate homeowners for 
nonforeclosure options, and fabricating documents related to the mortgage’s ownership or 
account status.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Mark 
Gongloff, Foreclosure Crisis Slams into Banks: After Days of Shrugging Off the Debacle, 
Financial Markets Start to Penalize U.S. Banks, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704361504575552380138195848.html.  
 5 Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title 
Recording System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 24 (2011), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/111/19_Marsh.pdf. 
 6 See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 4, at 48 (finding that 
“mortgage companies who filed claims . . . in bankruptcy cases of homeowners did not 
attach a copy of the note to 40% of their claims”). 
 7 See Assets Realization Co. v. Clark, 98 N.E. 457, 458-59 (N.Y. 1912); CIT 
Grp./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Walentas, 813 N.Y.S.2d 370, 370 (App. Div. 2006); Signal Fin. 
of N.Y., Inc. v. Polomaine, 519 N.Y.S.2d 933, 934 (Civ. Ct. 1987); see also 59 C.J.S. 
Mortgages § 628 (2011); 78 N.Y. JUR. 2D Mortgages and Deeds of Trust § 375 (2011). 
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redeem his security interest in the property.8 Even where the 
property is conveyed to a subsequent purchaser, courts will refuse 
to protect that party because he cannot satisfy the requirements 
of a bona fide purchaser for value.9 As demonstrated, this will 
cause a subsequent purchaser to lose his property.  
These problems could have a devastating effect on the 
real estate market.10 As prospective purchasers and title 
insurers become aware of these risks, owners of MERS-
mortgaged properties will suffer from “clouded title”11 as 
potential buyers begin to avoid their properties.12 This will 
affect homeowners’ ability to alienate their property, and it 
could cause widespread deadlocks in the real estate market—at 
least to the extent that MERS encounters documentation 
problems.13 Nevertheless, courts can avoid these dangers by 
utilizing principles of agency law. In particular, if courts accept 
MERS’s authority to act as an agent for lenders, those lenders 
would be bound by MERS’s discharges and would lose any 
claims against the property.14 Although the adoption of an 
agency theory might harm some homeowners by insulating 
MERS from attack in other areas,15 it would actually protect 
the vast majority of homeowners of MERS-mortgaged 
  
 8 See Assets Realization Co., 98 N.E. at 458-59; Walentas, 813 N.Y.S.2d at 
370; Polomaine, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 934. 
 9 See Curtis v. Moore, 46 N.E. 168, 169 (N.Y. 1897). 
 10 See 1 JOYCE D. PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE LAW § 1.2 (1994) (“Stability of 
land titles is critical not only to individual property owners, but also to society as a 
whole. . . . Development will not occur if lenders cannot be relatively certain that their 
real property collateral will be marketable.”). 
 11 Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage 
Servicing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 
111th Cong. 1 (2010) (written statement of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/ 
Media/file/hearings/111/Levitin111810.pdf; see 65 AM. JUR. 2D Quieting Title § 13 (2011) (“A 
cloud upon title may . . . be defined as . . . an apparent defect in the title that has the 
tendency, even in a slight degree, to cast doubt upon the owner’s title, and to stand in the 
way of the full and free exercise of his or her ownership.”). 
 12 See 1 JOYCE D. PALOMAR, supra note 10, § 1.2 (“Purchasers want assurance 
that the title is good before they invest money, time, and care, not damages from the 
grantor when the title proves to be defective.”). 
 13 See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 4, at 46-51 (explaining 
that lenders’ “documentation irregularities” may be quite “pervasive”). 
 14 See 2A N.Y. JUR. 2D Agency § 291 (2011) (“A principal is liable on contracts 
entered into on its behalf by an authorized agent.”). 
 15 In particular, a court’s recognition of MERS’s agency relationship with 
lenders would enable the company to initiate foreclosure actions on lenders’ behalf. See, 
e.g., Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1188-89 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that “[u]nder California law, a 
trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary or any of their authorized agents may conduct the 
foreclosure process” and finding that “the Deed of Trust expressly designated MERS as 
the nominee of the lender and as the beneficiary”). 
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properties, as well as prospective purchasers of those 
properties.16  
This note, in Part I, provides a brief overview of the 
MERS registry and how it operates within the mortgage finance 
industry. Part II provides a historical background of the 
property doctrines affecting MERS and the law of subsequent 
purchasers, including law pertaining to mortgages and the 
recording statutes. Part III discusses modern developments in 
mortgage finance by tracing the market’s evolution toward 
mortgage securitization and explaining how MERS alters the 
traditional securitization framework. Part IV explores public 
reactions to MERS, including various courts’ decisions relating 
to MERS, the company’s recent legal battles with county 
recorders and Attorneys General, scholarly analysis of MERS, as 
well as attention MERS has received from the public at large. 
Part V analyzes the frequently overlooked problems MERS 
poses for subsequent purchasers. In particular, this Note argues 
that subsequent purchasers of MERS-mortgaged properties will 
not constitute bona fide purchasers for value and that MERS’s 
documentation problems pose severe risks to them and to the 
real estate market generally. Finally, Part VI suggests that 
courts can avoid these issues by recognizing MERS’s authority to 
act as an agent for its members.  
I. MERS  
MERS operates a large, electronic document registry 
that “track[s] ownership interests in residential mortgages.”17 
Financial institutions18 created MERS in response to the 
perceived inefficiency and costliness of the traditional 
recording system,19 under which lenders were required to 
  
 16 Recent census data reveal that most Americans are current on their 
mortgage payments, while less than 19 percent are delinquent or involved in 
foreclosure. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
2012, at 743 tbl.1194 (131st ed. 2011) (estimating that 4.6 percent of residential 
mortgage loans were in the foreclosure process at year-end in 2010, 5.0 percent were 
entering the foreclosure process at year-end 2010, and 9.3 percent were “delinquent 30 
days or more”).  
 17 MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 2006). 
 18 MERS shareholders who “played a critical role in the development of 
MERS” include Bank of America, CitiMortgage, Inc., HSBC Finance Corp., Wells Fargo 
Bank, GMAC Residential Funding Corp., Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, the American Land Title Association, and First American Title Insurance 
Corp. Shareholders, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/about/shareholders.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
 19 Phyllis K. Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 805, 810 (1995) (“Over the life of a loan, the 
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record changes in mortgage ownership with county recorders 
and pay a fee.20 Indeed, on its website, MERS states that it was 
“created . . . to streamline the mortgage process by using 
electronic commerce to eliminate paper”21 and that its “mission 
is to register every mortgage loan in the United States on the 
MERS® System.”22 Not surprisingly, financial institutions that 
are active in the mortgage finance industry find MERS 
attractive precisely for these reasons: it facilitates the efficient 
transfer of mortgages and mortgage notes among numerous 
parties,23 and it avoids the costly and often slow process of 
recording these transfers with the county clerk.24 
MERS alters the traditional mortgage financing system 
by permitting “[l]enders [to] identify MERS as nominee and 
mortgagee for its members’ successors and assignees.”25 Once a 
mortgage is registered with MERS, “the beneficial ownership 
interest or servicing rights may be transferred among MERS 
members”26 in order to bundle mortgages into securities more 
effectively.27 However, throughout this entire process, “MERS 
remains the mortgagee of record in local county recording offices 
regardless of how many times the mortgage is transferred, thus 
freeing MERS’s members from paying the recording fees that 
would otherwise be furnished to the relevant localities.”28 Only 
  
current environment is very costly to the industry.”); see also Bank of N.Y. v. 
Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 535 (App. Div. 2011) (“MERS’s implementation followed 
the delays occasioned by local recording offices, which were at times slow in recording 
instruments because of complex local regulations and database systems that had 
become voluminous and increasingly difficult to search . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 20 See generally Romaine, 861 N.E.2d at 83 (analyzing the propriety of 
MERS’s business model with respect to avoiding recording fees traditionally associated 
with mortgage assignments). 
 21 About Us, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/about/index.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2011).  
 22 3 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 567.50 n.3 (3d 
ed. 2011). 
 23 See Dennis & Cha, Foreclosure Chaos, supra note 2. 
 24 See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the 
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (2010); Christian J. 
Hansen, Note, Property: Innovations to Historic Legal Traditions—Jackson v. Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 355, 383-85 (2010). 
 25 Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 536 (App. Div. 2011).  
 26 MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 2006).  
 27 See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 806-07 (explaining that an 
express purpose of MERS from its outset was “to reduce processing costs” for members 
engaged in pooling and marketing mortgage notes on the secondary market); see also 
Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Loan Chaos May Pose Wider Peril, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/06/ 
AR2010100607245.html [hereinafter Dennis & Cha, Loan Chaos]. 
 28 Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 536. 
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upon a transfer to a nonmember29 or a discharge of the 
mortgage30 will the company seek to record any change in 
mortgage ownership. Moreover, notwithstanding its constructive 
claim of ownership with the county recording offices, “MERS does 
not lend money, does not receive payments on promissory notes, 
and does not service loans by collecting loan payments.”31  
II. PROPERTY DOCTRINES AFFECTING MERS 
To fully understand the MERS system, how it operates, 
and its effects on the real estate market, one must first 
understand the property doctrines that provide its foundation.  
A. Mortgages 
“A mortgage is a conveyance or retention of an interest in 
real property as security for performance of an obligation,”32 
where the obligation “is almost always a loan of money 
evidenced by a promissory note.”33 To avoid confusion, one must 
distinguish between a mortgage, on one hand, and a mortgage 
note or promissory note, on the other. A “mortgage” is a security 
interest that a lender holds in the underlying property,34 
whereas a “promissory note” represents a borrower’s obligation 
to repay his loan.35 Conceptually, mortgage transactions are 
structured as follows. First, a lender provides funds to a 
borrower in order to initiate a property transfer from a third 
party.36 Second, the borrower executes the transfer and obtains 
title to the property.37 In exchange for the borrowed funds, the 
  
 29 See Romaine, 861 N.E.2d at 83 n.4 (“If a MERS member transfers 
ownership interest or servicing rights in a mortgage loan to a non-MERS member, an 
assignment from the MERS member to the non-MERS member is recorded in the 
County Clerk’s office and the loan is deactivated within the MERS system.”). 
 30 See Foreclosure & Bankruptcy, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/Foreclosures/ 
index.aspx (follow “click here” hyperlink for Rules of Membership, Rule 2 § 8(a)) (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2011). 
 31 Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 536.  
 32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (1997). 
 33 JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 358 (2d ed. 2008) 
(emphasis omitted).  
 34 See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 
§ 1.1 (5th ed. 2007). 
 35 See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 369-70 (1993). 
 36 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, § 1.1. 
 37 See id. § 1.5. Depending on the jurisdiction, the borrower may hold legal title 
to the property—subject to his satisfaction of the mortgage—or the lender may hold legal 
title to the property, which reverts back to the borrower upon satisfaction of the 
mortgage. See id. (explaining the distinction between the “title theory” and “lien theory”). 
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borrower (mortgagor) delivers to the lender (mortgagee) a 
promissory note and a mortgage.38  
A mortgage is commonly terminated either by 
foreclosure39 or through a satisfaction and discharge.40 Where a 
borrower defaults on his obligation to the lender, the lender has 
the power to redeem his security interest in the property 
through foreclosure.41 By contrast, where a borrower makes 
“payment at or before maturity,”42 the borrower’s payment will 
terminate the mortgage.43 Nevertheless, whether the owner of 
the mortgage—as opposed to the owner of the mortgage note—
can properly discharge a borrower’s debt may prove important to 
borrowers and their successors in interest. For example, in New 
York, a note secured by a mortgage “will not be discharged by 
payment to the record holder if . . . the note and mortgage ha[ve] 
already been transferred . . . , even though no assignment has 
been recorded.”44 Indeed, courts have cautioned that “[t]he 
satisfaction of the mortgage [is] not a blanket release of [a 
borrower’s] obligations under the note.”45 Accordingly, a payment 
to the wrong individual would be “at [the borrower’s] peril.”46 
B. Recordation and the Recording Acts 
The recording acts were developed “to secure a 
permanent record of landholding, and to prevent fraudulent 
  
 38 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1.1 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1997). 
 39 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1301 (McKinney 2009). 
 40 See, e.g., id. § 1921(1) (“After payment of authorized principal, interest and 
any other amounts due . . . , a mortgagee of real property . . . must execute and 
acknowledge . . . a satisfaction of mortgage . . . .”).  
 41 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 (1997). 
When an obligation secured by a mortgage becomes due, the mortgagee may 
either . . . obtain a judgment against any person who is personally liable on 
the obligation and, to the extent that the judgment is not satisfied, foreclose 
the mortgage on the real estate for the balance . . . or . . . foreclose the 
mortgage and, to the extent that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale do not 
satisfy the obligation, obtain a judgment for the deficiency against any person 
who is personally liable on the obligation . . . . 
Id. 
 42 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, SECOND THOMAS EDITION § 101.03(c) 
(David A. Thomas ed., 2008). 
 43 See id. 
 44 Assets Realization Co. v. Clark, 98 N.E. 457, 458 (N.Y. 1912). 
 45 CIT Grp./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Walentas, 813 N.Y.S.2d 370, 370 (App. Div. 
2006); see Signal Fin. of N.Y., Inc. v. Polomaine, 519 N.Y.S.2d 933, 934 (Civ. Ct. 1987) 
(holding that “[t]he underlying obligation, as evidenced by the note, survive[d] the 
Discharge of the Mortgage”); see also 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 628 (2009); 78 N.Y. JUR. 2D 
Mortgages and Deeds of Trust § 375 (2003).  
 46 Assets Realization Co., 98 N.E. at 459. 
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claims to lands by concealment of transfers.”47 In large part, the 
recording acts effectuate these purposes by providing a “fruitful 
source[] of notice to a purchaser”48 or by documenting which 
landowners have won the “race to the record.”49 United States 
jurisdictions emphasize these features of recordation to varying 
degrees through their recording statutes.50 In particular, 
jurisdictions utilize three variations: race statutes,51 notice 
statutes,52 and race-notice statutes.53  
Race statutes54 “protect[] the first purchaser to record.”55 
Accordingly, a purchaser’s “notice or knowledge of prior 
unrecorded claims is irrelevant” to determining his protection 
under the statute.56 Simply put, as between two competing 
interests in land, “the first to record has priority.”57  
By contrast, notice statutes58 generally protect only 
those subsequent purchasers who can satisfy the requirements 
of a “bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration.”59 A bona 
fide purchaser is a purchaser “without notice of prior 
unrecorded interests that are subject to the recording act.”60 
Under this standard, “several kinds of notice . . . may 
disqualify a person from . . . protection,”61 including actual 
notice, constructive notice, and inquiry notice.62 Actual notice 
occurs where the purchaser has “actual knowledge of the prior 
interest.”63 Constructive notice occurs where “a reasonable title 
  
 47 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).  
 48 Id. § 17.17.  
 49 Id. § 17.5. 
 50 See generally id. (explaining the various recording statutes that states 
have adopted).  
 51 See 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(a). 
 52 See id. § 92.08(b). 
 53 See id. § 92.08(c). 
 54 Race statutes are very uncommon across United States jurisdictions. Only 
Arkansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania have enacted race 
statutes for mortgages. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, § 17.5, 545 n.63; 
11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(a), 158 nn.283-84. 
 55 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(a). 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 Notice statutes are far more common than race statutes. Alabama, Arizona, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia have all enacted notice statutes 
for mortgages. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, § 17.5, 545 n.63; see also 11 
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(b), 159 n.286. 
 59 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, § 17.10; see 11 THOMPSON 
ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(b). 
 60 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.09(c). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
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search of the public real estate records would have revealed” a 
prior interest.64 Inquiry notice occurs where a purchaser has 
“notice of facts which would have caused a reasonable person to 
make further inquiries.”65 Pure notice statutes therefore 
represent the converse of race statutes: a subsequent purchaser 
must be bona fide,66 but he “need not record to qualify 
for . . . protection.”67  
Race-notice statutes68 occupy an intermediary position 
between race and notice statutes, combining elements of both.69 
In particular, race-notice statutes require both that the 
subsequent purchaser record first70 and that he represent a bona 
fide purchaser for value.71 So long as a purchaser can satisfy 
these requirements, the statutes will protect his interest.72  
III. MODERN MORTGAGE FINANCE: THE RISE OF 
SECURITIZATION AND MERS 
Developments in mortgage finance that have occurred 
over the last century illustrate why financial institutions created 
MERS and how MERS facilitates their businesses. Perhaps the 
most important development for mortgage finance has been the 
creation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac).73 As a matter of financial policy, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac both serve important functions for the mortgage market.74 
First, “[t]hey facilitate the flow of capital from areas of the 
country where funds are plentiful to places in which mortgage 
money is in short supply,” thereby providing liquidity to local 
banks.75 Second, “they move capital investment from other 
  
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, §§ 17.10-17.11; 11 
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.09(c). 
 67 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(b). 
 68 Race-notice statutes are the most common recording statute. Alaska, 
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have all enacted race-notice statutes for mortgages. 4 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, § 17.5, 545 n.63; see also 11 THOMPSON ON 
REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(c), 160 n.288. 
 69 See 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(c). 
 70 See id. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, § 11.3. 
 74 See id.  
 75 See id. 
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sectors of the national economy into the mortgage market.”76 
Finally, they “even out regional differences in interest rates” and 
“create a means of spreading the risks inherent in mortgage 
portfolios that [are] heavily concentrated in one state or 
region.”77 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac accomplish these goals 
by purchasing “vast amounts of home loans from savings banks 
and other lenders” throughout the country.78 The companies 
then issue “mortgage-backed securities,”79 which are based on 
pools of the underlying mortgage loans.80 This process requires 
the cooperation of several different entities.81 Additionally, prior 
to the creation of MERS, most of these transactions were 
recorded with the county recorder’s office.82 Figure A83 below 
represents a securitization chain where MERS is not involved.  
 
In the wake of MERS’s implementation, financial 
institutions could execute the securitization process much more 
  
 76 See id. 
 77 LEFCOE, supra note 35, at 453 n.205. 
 78 Id. at 454. 
 79 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, § 11.3.  
 80 See LEFCOE, supra note 35, at 452. 
 81 Id. at 454. 
 82 See Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 536 (App. Div. 2011). 
 83 This diagram is based on a symposium presentation on Securitization and 
Governance given by Nancy Wallace. See Nancy Wallace, Presentation at the U.C. 
Berkeley Symposium: Private-Label Residential Mortgage Securitization: Recording 
Innovations and Bankruptcy Remoteness 7 (Mar. 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/Wallace_MERS.pdf.  
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quickly.84 Indeed, some have even suggested that this may have 
played a role in causing the financial crisis.85 Nevertheless, speed 
is not MERS’s only advantage for financial institutions. The 
MERS system also allows its members to avoid paying recording 
fees on transfers occurring within the registry.86 Indeed, county 
recorders around the country have begun to file lawsuits against 
MERS in an effort to recover lost fees.87 Moreover, financial 
institutions appear to lose nothing by utilizing this system. Once 
a loan enters the MERS system, members authorize MERS to act 
on their behalf with respect to the property.88 Accordingly, 
financial institutions are able to increase the volume of their 
business and reduce costs while also retaining the ability to 
initiate legal proceedings through MERS.89 Figure B90 below 
represents a securitization chain where MERS acts as mortgagee 
of record.  
  
 84 See Dennis & Cha, Loan Chaos, supra note 27 (“MERS allow[s] big 
financial firms to trade mortgages at lightning speed . . . .”).  
 85 See id. (suggesting that “[w]ithout this system, the business of creating 
massive securities made of thousands of mortgages would likely have never taken off”). 
 86 See Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 536 (“MERS delivers savings to the 
participants in the real estate mortgage industry by allowing those entities to avoid the 
payment of fees which local governments require to record mortgage assignments.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 87 See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 67, Dallas Cnty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., No. CC-11-
06571-E (Tex. Cnty. Ct. Sept. 20, 2011). 
 88 See Sample MOM Mortgage, supra note 1, at 3 (“Borrower does hereby 
mortgage, grant and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s 
successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS, the following 
described property . . . .”).  
 89 See, e.g., Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 
1188-90 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 90 This diagram is based on a symposium presentation on Securitization and 
Governance given by Nancy Wallace. See Wallace, supra note 83, at 11.  
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IV. PUBLIC REACTIONS TO MERS 
MERS has achieved significant notoriety in the wake of 
the financial collapse. MERS currently finds itself at the center 
of a national foreclosure crisis—where approximately one in 
twenty homeowners faces foreclosure91 and MERS is listed on 
more than 60 percent of mortgages nationwide.92 As a result, 
MERS’s name has surfaced in thousands of foreclosure and 
bankruptcy actions throughout the country.93 Nevertheless, 
courts remain divided over the legal status of MERS’s business 
practices.94 Some have held that MERS lacks standing to 
  
 91 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 16, at 743 tbl.1194 (estimating that 
4.6 percent of residential mortgage loans were in the foreclosure process at year-end in 
2010 and that 5.0 percent were entering the foreclosure process at year-end 2010).  
 92 See Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 539 (App. Div. 2011).  
 93 See John R. Hooge & Laurie Williams, Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc.: A Study of Cases Discussing MERS’ Authority to Act, No. 8 NORTON 
BANKR. L. ADVISOR 1, 8-13 (Aug. 2010) (collecting cases examining MERS’s authority to 
act in foreclosure proceedings); Sharon McGann Horstkamp, MERS Case Law 
Overview, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 458, 459-75 (2010) (collecting cases regarding 
MERS’s ability to foreclose); see also MERS LAW DEP’T, MERSCORP, INC. & MORTGAGE 
ELEC. REGISTRATION SYS., INC., CASE LAW OUTLINE 8-93 (July 2011), available at 
http://www.mersinc.org/files/filedownload.aspx?id=302&table=DownloadFile; MERS 
LAW DEP’T, MERSCORP, INC. & MORTGAGE ELEC. REGISTRATION SYS., INC., CASE LAW 
OUTLINE at 10-76 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.mersinc.org/files/ 
filedownload.aspx?id=241&table=DownloadFile.  
 94 Compare Pantoja, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1188-89 (holding that “[u]nder 
California law, a trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary or any of their authorized agents 
may conduct the foreclosure process” and finding that “the Deed of Trust expressly 
designated MERS as the nominee of the lender and as the beneficiary” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), with In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 253 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
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pursue foreclosure actions95 or bankruptcy stay relief motions.96 
Other courts have ruled to the contrary.97 This lack of 
uniformity has created potentially devastating uncertainty for 
the mortgage industry. 
Recent lawsuits from Attorneys General and county 
recorders throughout the country have only added to this 
uncertainty. In particular, Attorneys General in Delaware and 
Massachusetts have both filed recent lawsuits against MERS, 
alleging “deceptive trade practices”98 and “deceptive business 
practices,”99 respectively. Moreover, Nevada’s Attorney General 
has brought suit against Lender Processing Services, a major 
“default and foreclosure processor that works behind the scenes 
for most large banks,” alleging “deceptive foreclosure practices” 
in the wake of the robo-signing scandal.100 Finally, county 
recorders throughout the United States have mounted legal 
attacks against MERS by claiming that the MERS system 
“bypass[es] local recording laws”101 and deprives counties of 
“millions in property recording filing fees.”102 
Given the current economic climate, it is not hard to 
understand why MERS has captured such widespread 
attention from the public and from publicly elected officials. 
Although economists declare that the U.S. recession officially 
  
(citing Steinbeck v. Steinbeck Heritage Found., 400 F. App’x 572, 575 (2d Cir. 2010)) 
(“[T]he record of this case is insufficient to prove that an agency relationship exists 
under the laws of the state of New York between MERS and its members. . . . [T]he fact 
that MERS is named ‘nominee’ in the Mortgage is not dispositive of the existence of an 
agency relationship and does not, in and of itself, give MERS any ‘authority to act.’”). 
 95 See, e.g., Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 539. 
 96 See, e.g., In re Agard, 444 B.R. at 253. 
 97 See, e.g., Pantoja, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1188-89. 
 98 Nathalie Tadena, Delaware Files Complaint Against Mortgage Registry, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970203687504577002173640854262.html.  
 99 Gretchen Morgenson, Massachusetts Sues 5 Major Banks over Foreclosure 
Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/02/business/ 
major-banks-face-new-foreclosure-suit.html.  
 100 Gretchen Morgenson, From East to West, Foreclosure Horror Stories, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/business/mortgage-servicing-
horror-stories-fair-game.html?pagewanted=all; see id. (“The complaint, which came 
after a 14-month inquiry, contends that [Lender Processing Services] deceived 
consumers by committing widespread document execution fraud, misrepresenting its 
fees and making deceptive statements about its efforts to correct paperwork.”).  
 101 Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, Aggressive Lobbying Defends Mortgage-
Trading System, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/18/AR2010111806137_pf.html.  
 102 Alex Ortolani, Mortgage Registry Falls Under Attack over Foreclosure, 
LAW360 (Dec. 16, 2011, 1:49 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/290977/mortgage-
registry-falls-under-attack-over-foreclosures.  
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ended in June 2009,103 household incomes have continued to fall 
by approximately 7 percent,104 unemployment rates have 
remained well above equilibrium levels,105 and foreclosure rates 
have continued to surge.106 Many Americans appear to be upset 
over a crisis that banks caused primarily through their risky 
business practices.107 Now that many Americans are facing 
foreclosure108 at the hands of those very same institutions,109 
  
 103 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, BUS. CYCLE DATING COMM. (Sept. 20, 
2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf (“The Business Cycle Dating Committee 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research . . . determined that a trough in business 
activity occurred in the U.S. economy in June 2009. The trough marks the end of the 
recession that began in December 2007 . . . .”). 
 104 Robert Pear, Recession Officially Over, U.S. Incomes Kept Falling, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/us/recession-officially-over-
us-incomes-kept-falling.html?_r=1. 
 105 Compare U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, USDL-12-
0402, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—FEBRUARY 2012 summary tbl.A (2012), available 
at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf (citing unemployment rates of 8.3 
percent nationally in February 2012), and U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, USDL-12-0012, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—DECEMBER 2011 summary 
tbl.A (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_ 
01062012.pdf (citing unemployment rates of 9.4 percent nationally in December 2010), 
with Robert Shimer, The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and 
Vacancies, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 27 (2005) (calculating an average monthly 
unemployment rate of 5.67 percent between 1951 and 2003); see also CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2008 TO 2017, at 25-26 
(2007) (forecasting long-term unemployment rates of 5.0 percent).  
 106 See Alex Tanzi, Bloomberg U.S. Mortgage Delinquency, Foreclosure Rates, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2011) (showing increases in foreclosure rates between September 
30, 2009 and September 30, 2011 from 7.22 percent to 9.13 percent for prime loans, 
from 11.68 percent to 13.45 percent for Alt-A loans, and from 16.51 percent to 18.03 
percent for subprime loans); Alex Tanzi, Bloomberg U.S. Mortgage Delinquency, 
Foreclosure Rates, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2009) (showing increases in foreclosure rates 
between September 30, 2007 and September 30, 2009 from 0.79 percent to 7.22 percent 
for prime loans, from 1.56 percent to 11.68 percent for Alt-A loans, and from 6.16 
percent to 16.51 percent for subprime loans). 
 107 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xv-xxviii (2011) (tracing the origins of the 
financial crisis to “excessive borrowing” by individuals and financial institutions, 
“collapsing mortgage-lending standards,” an overactive mortgage securitization 
industry, “failures [by] credit rating agencies” to adequately assess risk, “corporate 
governance and risk management” failures, “breakdown[s] in accountability and 
ethics,” and over “30 years of [financial] deregulation”). 
 108 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 16, at 743 tbl.1194. 
 109 Even a cursory review of recent foreclosure litigation demonstrates that 
most major financial institutions have initiated foreclosure actions against borrowers. 
See, e.g., Mejia v. GMAC Mortg. LLC, No. CV 11-01140-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 786328 (D. 
Ariz. Mar. 9, 2012) (GMAC); Benford v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11-12200, 2011 WL 
5525942 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2011) (Citi); Vela v. Freddie Mac Loan Mortg. Corp. (In re 
Vela), Adversary No. 11-5004, 2011 WL 3439256 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2011) (Wells Fargo); 
Matthews v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, No. 3:11-CV-00972-M, 2011 WL 3347920 
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2011) (JPMorgan Chase); Liu v. Bank of America, No. 08-CV-3358 
(JG), 2010 WL 1702537 (E.D.N.Y Apr. 28, 2010) (Bank of America); DiGiovanni v. BAC 
Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 2D11-5265, 2012 WL 832790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 
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they may view MERS as a symbol of the same overzealous 
financial culture that contributed to the crisis.110 Indeed, some 
have even advocated confronting MERS directly in quiet-title 
actions and foreclosure proceedings.111 
V. RISKS FOR SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS OF MERS-
MORTGAGED PROPERTY 
While MERS has captured widespread public attention for 
its role in the foreclosure crisis,112 the company’s business 
practices raise equally important questions for purchasers of 
MERS-mortgaged properties. As recent events have shown, 
failures by financial institutions and MERS to properly document 
assignments of mortgage notes have created a risk that neither 
can determine who owns the note or recreate the chain of title for 
any particular mortgage.113 Courts in several states have already 
held that MERS’s inability to produce both the mortgage and the 
  
14, 2012) (Bank of America and Countrywide); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Taher, No. 
9320/09, 2011 WL 2610525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 1, 2011) (HSBC).  
 110 This is particularly true where many of the most prominent banks “played 
a critical role in the development of MERS.” Shareholders, MERS, 
http://www.mersinc.org/about/shareholders.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) 
(identifying Bank of America, CitiMortgage, Inc., HSBC Finance Corp., Wells Fargo 
Bank, GMAC Residential Funding Corp., Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, 
and Freddie Mac as MERS shareholders). 
 111 See Christopher Ketcham, STOP PAYMENT! A Homeowners’ Revolt 
Against the Banks, HARPER’S, Jan. 2012, at 29 (chronicling homeowners’ efforts to 
“attack the banking industry with the fine print of real estate law” by “demanding 
proof of who really own[s] their loan”). 
 112 See, e.g., Scot J. Paltrow, Facing Criticism, MERS Cuts Role in 
Foreclosures, REUTERS (July 27, 2011, 4:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/07/27/us-mers-foreclosure-idUSTRE76Q67L20110727; Michael Powell & 
Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May Have Swallowed Your Loan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/business/06mers.html; Tadena, supra note 
98; Nick Timiraos, Oregon Judge Denies Foreclosure, Challenges MERS, WALL ST. J. 
DEVS. BLOG (May 26, 2011, 5:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2011/05/ 
26/oregon-judge-denies-foreclosure-challenges-mers/.  
 113 See Verified Complaint at 30, Delaware v. MERSCORP, Inc., No. 6987, 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 2011) (citing Transcript of Hearing at 6-8, 16-17, In re Kemp, 440 
B.R. 624, 626 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (No. 08-18700) (Aug. 11, 2009)) (“[I]n a 2009 
hearing . . . , an employee for the Bank of America entity responsible for servicing the 
securitized Countrywide mortgage loans testified under oath that Countrywide did not 
have a practice of delivering original documents such as the note to the Trustee . . . . In 
addition, the same employee further testified that allonges are typically prepared in 
anticipation of foreclosure litigation, rather than at the time the mortgage loans are 
purportedly securitized.”); see also Gongloff, supra note 4 (“The crisis has been 
escalating for several weeks, as banks suspend foreclosures across the country, citing 
flaws they have uncovered, including faulty or missing documentation. Tales of 
mismanagement within the foreclosure process—including so-called robo-signers, who 
were paid to rubber stamp documents without properly reviewing them—are emerging 
daily.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Flawed Paperwork Aggravates Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/business/04mortgage.html.  
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note is fatal to its ability to foreclose.114 However, MERS’s 
inability to produce the note generates problems that transcend 
the foreclosure arena. In particular, it threatens title to MERS-
mortgaged properties that are subsequently purchased by third 
parties, and it places a cloud on title for existing homeowners 
whose properties list MERS as the mortgagee of record.  
A. Framing the Issue 
MERS raises a host of issues that could pose risks to 
subsequent purchasers. For example, imagine the following 
scenario, represented below by Figure C.115 A is a homeowner 
who financed the purchase of his home with a mortgage. A’s 
lender, Bank Z, provided funds to A in order make the 
purchase, but in exchange, Bank Z required A to execute two 
documents. First, A executed a mortgage on the property to 
MERS, “solely as nominee for [Bank Z] and [Bank Z]’s 
successors and assigns.”116 Second, A executed a promissory 
note to Bank Z, secured by the mortgage to MERS. After 
closing the transaction, MERS recorded its mortgage at the 
county recorder’s office. Subsequently, Bank Z assigned the 
note to Bank Y, who then assigned the note to Bank X, who 
later assigned the note to Bank W. All of these assignments 
were executed in order to securitize A’s mortgage note, but 
none were recorded. Instead, the banks utilized MERS to track 
their assignments. However, MERS and the relevant banks 
either lost track of the note or failed to properly execute their 
assignments. As a result, the banks suffer from missing or 
inconsistent paperwork with respect to the note.  
Meanwhile, A wanted to sell his home and remained 
current on his mortgage payments. B demonstrated interest in 
A’s property and decided to buy it. At the closing, B distributed 
funds to A, which A tendered to MERS in order to satisfy the 
remaining balance on his note. In exchange for A’s payment, 
  
 114 See, e.g., Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., 301 
S.W.3d 1, 3-8 (Ark. 2009); Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158, 166-69 (Kan. 
2009); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 295-97 (Me. 2010); 
Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 539 (App. Div. 2011).  
 115 This visual representation is intended to provide the reader with a 
conceptual understanding of the various relationships that might exist in a common 
real estate transaction. For the purpose of clarity, many facets of these relationships 
have been simplified, and extraneous parties have been omitted. For a more 
comprehensive visual representation of the mortgage securitization process with 
MERS, see Wallace, supra note 83, at 11; see also Powell & Morgenson, supra note 112 
(follow “How a Mortgage Moves Through MERS” hyperlink).  
 116 Sample MOM Mortgage, supra note 1, at 3.  
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MERS discharged its mortgage on the property.117 A then 
conveyed title to B. However, neither A nor B received any 
assurance that A’s debt was satisfied from the actual owner of 
A’s note. Instead, both relied on MERS’s discharge of the 
mortgage, in its capacity as mortgagee of record. Therefore, if 
MERS fails to distribute the proceeds to the owner of the note, 
it may be possible that the owner of A’s note has a claim 
against B’s property, which was pledged as security for the note. 
The viability of any claims against B’s property hinges on two 
critical questions. First, can MERS properly discharge A’s debt 
obligation and, in the process, extinguish any future claims by the 
owner of the note? Second, if MERS cannot properly discharge A’s 
debt, will courts recognize B’s claim to the property as superior to 
the noteholder’s prior unrecorded interest, on the ground that B is 
a bona fide purchaser for value?118 
 
  
 117 Depending upon the jurisdiction, MERS’s interest in the mortgage may 
represent legal title to the property or a lien against the property. See NELSON & 
WHITMAN, supra note 34, § 1.5 (explaining the distinction between the “title theory” 
and “lien theory”). Since New York adopts a lien theory, MERS technically does not 
convey legal title to the borrower but instead releases its lien on the mortgaged 
property. See Barson v. Mulligan, 84 N.E. 75, 78 (N.Y. 1908) (“[T]he mortgagee, having 
come to be regarded as a mere lienor, ha[s] no legal estate in the land covered by his 
mortgage . . . .”).  
 118 See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, §§ 17.10-17.11; 11 
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.09. 
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B. MERS’s Ability to Discharge the Debt  
As a threshold matter, it is unclear whether MERS can 
properly discharge the borrower’s obligation, given that MERS 
holds only an interest in the mortgage.119 For example, under 
New York law, a mortgagee is entitled to discharge a 
borrower’s obligation upon the borrower’s satisfaction of the 
mortgage debt.120 Importantly for MERS, the relevant statute 
defines “mortgagee” as “the current holder of the mortgage of 
record or the current holder of the mortgage.”121 Therefore, one 
who holds only the mortgage without a corresponding interest in 
the note can nevertheless discharge a mortgage under the 
statute.122 Indeed, the statute expressly provides for a discharge of 
the mortgage even where the mortgagee cannot produce the 
note.123 
The inquiry does not end here, however. 
Notwithstanding MERS’s ability to discharge a mortgage for 
recording purposes, a question remains as to what legal effect 
that discharge will have upon the owner of the note. In New 
York, a note secured by a mortgage “will not be discharged by 
payment to the record holder if . . . the note and mortgage ha[ve] 
already been transferred . . . , even though no assignment has 
been recorded.”124 In other words, a borrower cannot satisfy his 
debt by paying the record holder of the mortgage if the record 
holder has already assigned its interests to a third party, 
regardless of the third party’s failure to record.125 To that effect, 
the New York Court of Appeals has cautioned that “[w]here a 
  
 119 See Sample MOM Mortgage, supra note 1, at 3 (“Borrower understands 
and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in 
this Security Instrument . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Residential Funding Co., 
LLC v. Saurman, 807 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Mich. Ct. App.) (“MERS, as mortgagee, only 
held an interest in the property as security for the note, not an interest in the note 
itself.”), rev’d on other grounds, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 2011). 
 120 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1921(1) (McKinney 2011) (“After payment of 
authorized principal, interest and any other amounts due . . . , a mortgagee of real 
property . . . must execute and acknowledge . . . a satisfaction of mortgage . . . .”). 
 121 Id. § 1921(9)(a). The statutory definition of “mortgagee” also includes “any 
person to whom payments are required to be made” or “their personal representatives, 
agents, successors, or assigns.” Id.  
 122 See id.  
 123 See id. § 1921(4) (“If the mortgagee has delivered such satisfaction of 
mortgage in a timely manner and has certified that the note and/or mortgage are not in 
its possession as of such date, the mortgagee shall not be liable under this section if the 
mortgagee agrees to defend and hold harmless the mortgagor by reason of the inability 
or failure of the mortgagee to furnish the note or mortgage within the time period 
prescribed in this subdivision . . . .”). 
 124 Assets Realization Co. v. Clark, 98 N.E. 457, 458 (N.Y. 1912).  
 125 Id. 
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party makes . . . a final payment in satisfaction of a bond and 
mortgage without taking a satisfaction and without requiring 
production of the instruments, or receiving some sufficient 
excuse for their nonproduction, the payment is at his peril and 
not good as against an assignee for value under an unrecorded 
assignment.”126 At bottom, New York law embodies the principle 
that a borrower should require his mortgagee to demonstrate 
contemporaneous ownership of the mortgage and note before 
tendering a final payment on the mortgage.127 Otherwise, the 
payment is made “at his peril.”128 This appears to flow from the 
maxim that “a transfer of the mortgage without the debt is a 
nullity.”129 Given that “a mortgage is but an incident to the debt 
which it is intended to secure,”130 it follows that the release of a 
mortgage should remain ineffective as against the owner of the 
note, who may not have received the final payment.131  
Where MERS acts as mortgagee of record, these 
principles bear directly on MERS’s ability to properly discharge 
a borrower’s obligation. Since MERS has no interest in the 
underlying mortgage note,132 the company can release only its 
interest in the mortgage. However, given that “a transfer of the 
mortgage without the debt is a nullity,”133 a release of the   
 126 Id. at 459; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 6.4 cmt. c 
(1997) (“When payment or tender by the person primarily responsible for the debt has 
extinguished the mortgage, the payor derives little comfort unless a document can be 
recorded to clear the public records of the mortgage lien. . . . In some states it is 
customary for the mortgagee to provide an endorsement on the public records, to 
display the promissory note, marked ‘paid,’ to the recorder’s office personnel, or to 
return the original mortgage document.” (emphasis added)). 
 127 See Assets Realization Co., 98 N.E. at 458-59. It bears mentioning that this 
principle is analogous to the requirements imposed upon parties seeking foreclosure in 
New York. See Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 537 (App. Div. 2011) (“In 
a mortgage foreclosure action, a plaintiff has standing where it is both the holder or 
assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at 
the time the action is commenced.”); U.S. Bank v. Collymore, 890 N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 
(App. Div. 2009); Kluge v. Fugazy, 536 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (App. Div. 1988). 
 128 Assets Realization Co., 98 N.E. at 459. 
 129 Merritt v. Bartholick, 36 N.Y. 44, 45 (1867).  
 130 Id.  
 131 See CIT Grp./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Walentas, 813 N.Y.S.2d 370, 370 (App. 
Div. 2006) (“The satisfaction of the mortgage was not a blanket release of defendants’ 
obligations under the note.”); Signal Fin. of N.Y., Inc. v. Polomaine, 519 N.Y.S.2d 933, 
934 (Civ. Ct. 1987) (holding that “[t]he underlying obligation, as evidenced by the note, 
survive[d] the Discharge of the Mortgage”); see also 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 628 (2011); 
78 N.Y. JUR. 2D Mortgages and Deeds of Trust § 375 (2011).  
 132 See Sample MOM Mortgage, supra note 1, at 3 (“Borrower understands and 
agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this 
Security Instrument . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Residential Funding Co, LLC v. 
Saurman, 807 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Mich. Ct. App.) (“MERS, as mortgagee, only held an 
interest in the property as security for the note, not an interest in the note itself.”), rev’d 
on other grounds, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 2011). 
 133 Bartholick, 36 N.Y. at 45.  
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mortgage without a release of the debt would likewise appear 
to be a nullity. Under these circumstances, a borrower’s failure 
to require MERS to “produce and deliver up the instruments 
which are being paid and satisfied”—in particular, the 
mortgage note—could place his payment in jeopardy.134  
Nevertheless, some authority exists135 to suggest that 
MERS may have the ability to discharge the borrower’s debt as 
an agent “for [the] Lender and Lender’s successors and 
assigns.”136 In MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine,137 the New York 
Court of Appeals held that MERS had authority to record 
discharges “[a]s the nominee for the mortgagee of record or for the 
last assignee.”138 Moreover, in an opinion dissenting in part, Chief 
Judge Kaye also appeared to accept MERS’s agency theory, 
suggesting that “the use of a nominee as the equivalent of an 
agent for the lender is apparent, and not unusual.”139 
Nevertheless, Chief Judge Kaye agreed with the majority by 
stating, 
[I]ssues concerning the underlying validity of the MERS mortgage 
instrument—in particular, whether its failure to transfer beneficial 
interest renders it a nullity under real property law, whether it 
violates the prohibition against separating the note from the 
mortgage, and whether MERS has standing to foreclose on a 
mortgage—are best left for another day.140 
The extent to which courts will recognize MERS’s agency 
powers beyond the context of the recording statutes remains to be 
seen. On one hand, some courts appear to have followed the Court 
of Appeals’ formulation of MERS’s agency authority.141 In 
particular, one court has held that “the language of the mortgage 
appoints MERS as nominee, or agent, for the lender and its 
successors and assigns for the purposes set forth therein.”142 
  
 134 Assets Realization Co., 98 N.E. at 459. 
 135 See MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 84 (N.Y. 2006). 
 136 Sample MOM Mortgage, supra note 1, at 3; see Brief for Petitioners-
Appellants at 27, MERSCORP, Inc., v. Romaine, 743 N.Y.S.2d 562 (App. Div. 2002) 
(No. 2001-04792), 2001 WL 34687001 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § l 
(1958)) (“MERS’s relationship with its member lenders is that of agent and principal. 
This is a fiduciary relationship, which results from the manifestation of consent of one 
person to allow another to act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by 
the other to so act. The principal is the one for whom action is to be taken, and the 
agent is the one who acts.”). 
 137 Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81. 
 138 Id. at 84. 
 139 Id. at 87 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting in part). 
 140 Id. at 87 n.* (emphasis added). 
 141 See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Pietranico, 928 N.Y.S.2d 818, 
829-30 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
 142 Id. 
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Accordingly, the same court found that MERS was entitled “to 
exercise any and all of the interests granted by the borrower 
under the mortgage,” including “the right to foreclose and sell the 
property[,] and to take any action required of the lender.”143  
However, other courts appear to have contradicted the 
Court of Appeals’ approach in favor of a more exacting 
standard.144 In particular, one court has refused to find that an 
agency relationship existed between MERS and its members by 
explaining that “the fact . . . MERS is named ‘nominee’ in the 
Mortgage is not dispositive of the existence of an agency 
relationship and does not, in and of itself, give MERS any 
‘authority to act.’”145 Additionally, another court has held that, 
“as nominee, MERS’s authority was limited to only those 
powers which were specifically conferred to it and authorized 
by the lender.”146 Although the mortgage gave MERS the right 
“to exercise any or all of those rights, [granted by the 
Borrowers to Countrywide] including, but not limited to, the 
right to foreclose and sell the Property,”147 the court 
nevertheless insisted that no party can initiate foreclosure 
without holding both the mortgage and the note at the time of 
the action.148 The implication of these cases is clear. Both 
suggest that the power to foreclose must be specifically 
authorized by the principal and that the language contained in 
the mortgage provides insufficient authorization. The same 
logic would also seem to extend to MERS’s ability to discharge 
the security instrument, which is another power the mortgage 
confers upon the mortgagee.149 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that no court has 
squarely addressed the issue of whether MERS’s discharges 
would be binding upon the owner of the note, particularly 
where the owner of the note is unknown150 and perhaps 
  
 143 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144 See, e.g., In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 253 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011); Bank of 
N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 537 (App. Div. 2011); Bank of N.Y. v. Alderazi, 
900 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823-24 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 145 In re Agard, 444 B.R. at 253. 
 146 Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147 Id. at 534 (alterations in original).  
 148 Id. at 537. 
 149 See Sample MOM Mortgage, supra note 1, at 3 (“MERS (as nominee for Lender 
and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right . . . to take any action required of Lender 
including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.”). 
 150 MERS’s principal might be unknown to MERS in two ways. First, MERS 
presumably cannot determine, upon origination of the mortgage, who will later receive 
an assignment of the note and on whose behalf MERS will act when discharging the 
obligation. Therefore, at the time of origination, the mortgage purports to create an 
agency relationship between MERS and a class of unknown third parties, one of whom 
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unknowable151 to MERS. However, as courts continue to 
examine MERS’s agency authority, they should recognize that 
their decisions carry immense implications for subsequent 
purchasers of MERS-mortgaged properties. In particular, 
where the note has been lost or improperly assigned, two 
dangers emerge. First, MERS may lack the ability to identify 
the note’s true owner, which precludes the company from 
recording a proper discharge on behalf of the owner of the 
note.152 Second, MERS may lack the ability to identify all 
assignees in the chain of title to the note,153 which means that 
MERS cannot rule out the existence of potential claims by 
unknown assignees to a portion of the note’s proceeds. Under 
these circumstances, unsatisfied parties to the original 
mortgage note may have claims against the property, as 
security for the note, if those parties do not receive the funds to 
which they are entitled.154 Because MERS cannot determine 
how to distribute funds where it cannot identify the note’s 
owner, this likelihood does not appear to be remote.  
Accordingly, a subsequent purchaser may be at risk of 
losing his property when the note’s owner attempts to redeem 
the security interest, even though he takes the property totally 
unaware of any prior unrecorded assignees of the note or any 
potential claims they might possess. Indeed, when MERS 
releases its mortgage lien and the borrower then conveys the 
property to a third-party purchaser, the third party relies on 
the fact that all recorded interests appear to have been 
satisfied. Therefore, the question arises whether the recording 
statutes will protect the subsequent purchaser against prior 
unrecorded interests. In most jurisdictions,155 the third party 
must represent a bona fide purchaser for value.156  
  
will later receive the note. Second, MERS may also remain unaware of its principal’s 
identity at the time of discharge, given that MERS has the apparent authority to 
discharge the obligation itself and may refrain from investigating the note’s ownership.  
 151 MERS’s principal might be unknowable to the extent that documentation 
errors preclude MERS from ascertaining the true identity of the note’s owner.  
 152 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.  
 153 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.  
 154 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. 
 155 See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, § 17.5, 545 n.63 
(demonstrating that nearly every United States jurisdiction requires some form of 
notice to a subsequent purchaser). 
 156 See id. §§ 17.10-17.11; 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.09. 
2012] HOMEBUYER BEWARE 1655 
 
C. The Recording Acts and Bona Fide Purchasers for Value 
1. Race Jurisdiction 
In race jurisdictions,157 the recording acts generally 
“protect[] the first purchaser to record.”158 Accordingly, a 
purchaser’s “notice or knowledge of prior unrecorded claims is 
irrelevant” to determining his protection under the statute.159 For 
example, North Carolina’s statute provides that “instruments 
registered in the office of the register of deeds shall have 
priority based on the order of registration as determined by the 
time of registration.”160 Under this statute, a subsequent 
purchaser of a MERS-mortgaged property would be secure in 
his title to land only if he records his interest first in the local 
recorder’s office. However, if the true owner of the note beats 
the subsequent purchaser to record, the true owner’s prior 
unrecorded interest in the land would prevail.161  
2. Race-Notice Jurisdiction 
In race-notice jurisdictions,162 a subsequent purchaser 
must satisfy two requirements. First, he must “record [his 
interest] before the prior unrecorded claim is recorded.”163 Second, 
he must be “a purchaser for value without knowledge or notice of 
the prior unrecorded claim.”164 This second requirement demands, 
in other words, that he represent a bona fide purchaser for 
  
 157 As discussed in Part II, the following jurisdictions have enacted race statutes 
for mortgages: Arkansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 4 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, § 17.5, 545 n.63. However, some suggest that 
North Carolina “may have become a race-notice state by judicial decision.” 11 THOMPSON 
ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(a) n.283 (citing Rowe v. Walker, 441 S.E.2d 
156 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (John, J., dissenting), aff’d, 455 S.E.2d 160 (N.C. 1995)).  
 158 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(a). 
 159 Id. 
 160 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (2011).  
 161 See 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(a). 
 162 As discussed in Part II, the following jurisdictions have enacted race-notice 
statutes for mortgages: Alaska, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South 
Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, 
supra note 47, § 17.5, 545 n.63; see also 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 
42, § 92.08(c) n.288.  
 163 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(c). 
 164 Id.; see also J.B. Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 1 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 5 (1887) (“[I]f a trustee, in violation of his duty, should sell the trust property to one 
who had no notice of the trust, and should deliver the deed in escrow, the defrauded 
cestui que trust could not restrain the innocent purchaser from performing the 
condition, nor could he obtain any relief against him after he had acquired title.”). 
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value.165 For example, New York’s statute provides that 
“[e]very . . . conveyance not . . . recorded is void as against any 
person who subsequently purchases . . . the same real 
property . . . in good faith and for a valuable consideration, . . . and 
whose conveyance . . . is first duly recorded.”166 Of course, New 
York courts have supplied these statutory requirements with a 
judicially-crafted meaning. In particular, courts have refused to 
recognize a party’s status as a bona fide purchaser where that 
party possesses one of three features: actual notice,167 
constructive notice,168 or inquiry notice.169 A purchaser has 
actual notice where he purchases land “with knowledge of a 
prior outstanding title by an unrecorded deed.”170 A purchaser 
has constructive notice based on documents found within the 
record and “is presumed to have investigated the title, . . . to 
have examined every deed or instrument properly recorded, 
and to have known every fact disclosed or to which an inquiry 
suggested by the record would have led.”171 A purchaser has 
inquiry notice where he “had knowledge of facts or 
circumstances that would have [led] a reasonably prudent 
person to make inquiry into a possible defect of title.”172 Finally, 
courts have also warned that “[a] bona fide purchaser or 
encumbrancer for value is protected in its title unless the deed is 
void and conveys no title . . . or it had previous notice of the 
alleged fraud.”173  
In the case of subsequent purchasers of MERS-
mortgaged properties, regardless of whether such purchasers 
could win the “race to the courthouse,”174 it is unlikely that they 
could meet the requirements of a bona fide purchaser. First, 
the subsequent purchaser does not have actual notice of the 
existence of the note owner’s unrecorded claim to the 
  
 165 See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, §§ 17.10-17.11. While a 
purchase “for value” is required, this note assumes that all payments made by 
subsequent purchasers will satisfy this additional requirement. For a discussion of the 
“for value” requirement, see 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.09(c).  
 166 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2011). 
 167 See Todd v. Eighmie, 41 N.Y.S. 1013, 1015-16 (App. Div. 1896). 
 168 See HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Alphonso, 874 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (App. 
Div. 2009). 
 169 See Chen v. Geranium Dev. Corp., 663 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (App. Div. 1997). 
 170 Eighmie, 41 N.Y.S. at 1015-16. 
 171 Fairmont Funding, Ltd. v. Stefansky, 754 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (App. Div. 2003).  
 172 In re Fitzsimmons, 2008-3420/H, 2011 WL 4346679, at *3 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 
Aug. 10, 2011).  
 173 Id. 
 174 Kahan Jewelry, Inc. v. Korsinsky, No. 35022/02, 2004 WL 3078700, at *2 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004). 
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property.175 However, the subsequent purchaser may have 
constructive notice. In particular, a thorough investigation of 
the record would have uncovered the fact that MERS recorded 
a discharge of mortgage in favor of the borrower, which “so 
state[d]” that the mortgage had not been assigned “of record.”176 
A thorough investigation of the record also would have revealed 
that the note was never produced to accompany MERS’s 
discharge, and that the note’s owner never executed a separate 
discharge with respect to the note. These observations would 
have been sufficient to make the subsequent purchaser 
suspicious as to the state of his title.177 Moreover, the 
subsequent purchaser was aware of facts that might put him 
on inquiry as to the state of his title—in particular, that MERS 
was named on the mortgage. In light of the recent notoriety 
MERS has received for its documentation problems,178 this fact 
might cause a “reasonably prudent person to make inquiry into 
a possible defect of title.”179 Finally, it is also possible that, in 
some circumstances, courts will refuse to protect the 
subsequent purchaser because his deed is void by reason of 
fraud or forgery.180 This may be particularly relevant in 
MERS’s case if there were an allegation of forgery by a robo-
signer.181 Accordingly, a subsequent purchaser of MERS-
mortgaged property is unlikely to warrant the protection of a 
race-notice recording statute under these circumstances, 
regardless of whether he records his interest first.  
  
 175 See Eighmie, 41 N.Y.S. at 1015-16. 
 176 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 321(3) (McKinney 2011); see MERSCORP, Inc. v. 
Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 84-85 (N.Y. 2006). 
 177 See Curtis v. Moore, 46 N.E. 168, 169 (N.Y. 1897) (“[Defendant] was not a 
bona fide purchaser . . . because the record of the mortgage was notice to him that the 
mortgage was outstanding and unsatisfied, and it was no concern of his who happened 
to be the owner at the time. In dealing with the property on the assumption that [the 
record owner] still owned the mortgage, he acted at his peril, and assumed the risk 
that [the record owner] might have transferred the mortgage to someone else. He was 
put upon his inquiry, and it was not enough for him to examine the record, and see that 
no assignment of mortgage appeared thereon, but he should have required a 
satisfaction piece in due form, or the delivery of the mortgage and the note.”); see also 
HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Alphonso, 874 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (App. Div. 2009). 
 178 See supra notes 4-6, 113 and accompanying text. 
 179 In re Fitzsimmons, 2008-3420/H, 2011 WL 4346679, at *3 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 
Aug. 10, 2011). 
 180 Marden v. Dorthy, 54 N.E. 726, 728, 730 (N.Y. 1899). 
 181 Robo-signing has captured significant public interest around the country 
and has also garnered recent attention from prosecutors. See Michael Kraus, Nevada 
Attorney General Pursuing Criminal Charges Against Robo-signers, TOTAL MORTG. 
SERVS. (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.totalmortgage.com/blog/mortgage-rates/nevada-
attorney-general-pursuing-criminal-charges-against-robo-signers/14741.  
1658 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:4 
3. Notice Jurisdiction 
In notice jurisdictions,182 a subsequent purchaser need 
only meet the requirements of a bona fide purchaser for value 
in order to receive protection.183 Indeed, an important 
distinction from a race-notice statute is that, under a pure 
notice statute, “[o]ne need not record to qualify 
for . . . protection.”184 Nevertheless, a subsequent purchaser is 
unlikely to receive protection from a notice statute under these 
circumstances. Following a substantially similar analysis to that 
outlined above, subsequent purchasers of MERS-mortgaged 
properties are likely to have constructive notice and inquiry 
notice.185 Moreover, subsequent purchasers may face similar 
challenges due to robo-signing forgeries.186 Accordingly, a notice 
statute is also unlikely to provide any refuge. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS 
Because recording statutes cannot provide subsequent 
purchasers of MERS-mortgaged properties with adequate 
assurance to title, subsequent purchasers may suffer significant 
harms. Moreover, given MERS’s prevalence in today’s real estate 
market,187 courts will inevitably address this issue. Agency theory 
offers the best solution for all parties in resolving this conflict. 
A. Where MERS Cannot Properly Discharge the Mortgage 
MERS’s ability to properly discharge a borrower’s debt 
plays a critical role in the real estate market. If courts follow 
the common law rule and find that a borrower must receive a 
discharge from the owner of the note—as opposed to a 
discharge from MERS as owner of the mortgage—then the debt 
will remain effective and the owner of the note will have 
  
 182 As discussed in Part II, the following jurisdictions have enacted notice 
statutes for mortgages: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, 
and West Virginia. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, § 17.5, 545 n.63; see 
also 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(b) n.286.  
 183 See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, § 17.11; 11 THOMPSON 
ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(b). 
 184 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 92.08(b). 
 185 See supra Part V.C.2.  
 186 See supra Part V.C.2. 
 187 Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 539 (App. Div. 2011) (noting 
that MERS is listed on “approximately 60% of all mortgage loans in the United States”). 
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recourse against the borrower’s property.188 Indeed, this 
remains true under New York’s recording statutes.189 As we 
have seen, this may have disastrous effects for subsequent 
purchasers under each of the different recording statutes.190 In 
race jurisdictions, subsequent purchasers will face risks unless 
they can beat the note owner to the recorder’s office.191 And in 
the forty-six states192 that have adopted some form of notice or 
race-notice statute, subsequent purchasers face risks that a 
note owner might seek to enforce his rights against the 
property on the ground that purchasers had constructive or 
inquiry notice of the prior unrecorded claim.  
This scenario could have devastating consequences for 
subsequent purchasers and for the real estate market generally. 
First, subsequent purchasers throughout the country could face 
both economic loss and physical loss of property as a result of 
their defective titles.193 If a prior unrecorded interest remains 
unsatisfied, that party might pursue foreclosure against the 
property to redeem its security interest,194 leaving subsequent 
purchasers with nothing. In essence, they have “purchase[d] [not 
property but] a lawsuit.”195 However, it is likely that subsequent 
purchasers would have obtained title insurance to protect 
against the risk of defective title.196 If subsequent purchasers 
have obtained title insurance, the title policy would likely insure 
“against loss or damage . . . sustained or incurred by the insured 
by reason of . . . [a]ny defect in or lien or encumbrance on the 
title.”197 This provision includes any liens created by a prior 
  
 188 See Assets Realization Co. v. Clark, 98 N.E. 457, 459 (N.Y. 1912); CIT 
Grp./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Walentas, 813 N.Y.S.2d 370, 370 (App. Div. 2006); Signal Fin. 
of N.Y., Inc. v. Polomaine, 519 N.Y.S.2d 933, 934 (Civ. Ct. 1987); 78 N.Y. JUR. 2D 
Mortgages and Deeds of Trust § 375 (2011).  
 189 Although section 1921 of the New York Real Property Actions and 
Proceedings Law protects the borrower from claims by a mortgagee who cannot 
produce the note, it does not appear to protect the borrower from claims by the owner of 
the note, whose security interest was discharged without his knowledge or assent. N.Y. 
REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1921(4) (McKinney 2011). 
 190 See supra Part V.C.  
 191 See supra Part V.C.1.  
 192 See supra notes 162, 182.  
 193 See, e.g., Curtis v. Moore, 46 N.E. 168 (N.Y. 1897) (affirming judgment of 
foreclosure against subsequent purchaser based on purchaser’s inferior interest in the 
property).  
 194 See, e.g., id. 
 195 See 1 JOYCE D. PALOMAR, supra note 10, § 1.2 (“The basis for making a real 
property transaction contingent on evidence of clear, marketable title is the consensus 
in the law that a buyer should not have to purchase a lawsuit.”). 
 196 See id. § 5.5 (“The title insurer . . . assumes the risk of loss to the insured 
by reason of any defect in or lien or encumbrance on the insured title.”); 11 THOMPSON 
ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 93.03(a)(2). 
 197 2 JOYCE D. PALOMAR, supra note 10, app. C2. 
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mortgage on the property.198 Since the subsequent purchaser 
would suffer a loss when the owner of the prior unrecorded 
interest initiates foreclosure proceedings,199 the title insurer 
would indemnify this loss and the purchaser would receive 
remuneration.200  
Nevertheless, subsequent purchasers are still removed 
from their homes and businesses,201 and any indemnification 
they receive may fail to account for the subjective value they 
derived from the property.202 Homeowners “commonly value 
their own property in significant ways that the market does not 
recognize.”203 These values may include “investments in 
networks of friends and the development of social capital”204 as 
well as “the search costs of finding shops and services in the 
new location.”205 Perhaps most significant, however, is the 
homeowner’s personal attachment to the property206 and the 
loss of autonomy he would experience by losing it.207 Although 
the homeowner might receive reimbursement from a title 
insurer in order to purchase a new home, “the price of a 
replacement will not restore the status quo,”208 and “perhaps no 
amount of money can do so.”209 Therefore, a title insurer’s 
  
 198 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 93.03(a)(2) (“A 
mortgage creates a voluntary lien.”). 
 199 Id. § 93.04(b) (“An actual loss appears most clearly after foreclosure occurs, 
when a deficiency can subsequently be attributed to a covered superior lien or defect in 
title to the mortgage.”). 
 200 See 1 JOYCE D. PALOMAR, supra note 10, § 10.8 (“[T]he insurer owes . . . a 
duty to reimburse for actual losses the insured has incurred because of the title defect.”). 
 201 See id. § 1.2 (noting that “[p]urchasers of real property expect to be able to 
build businesses, establish homes, or otherwise improve their properties” and do not wish 
to “invest money, time, and care” into their properties if they will be subject to loss). 
 202 In large part, I owe many of my thoughts on this subject to Professor Brian 
Lee, whose notion of an “idiosyncratic premium” in eminent domain proceedings 
explores the problem of compensating property owners for subjective value. Brian Lee, 
Faculty Workshop at Brooklyn Law School: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent 
Domain (Sept. 8, 2011).  
 203 John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 783, 790 (2006); see Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just 
Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 700 (2005) (“Sentimental 
attachments, or a unique business enterprise, may prevent the market from accurately 
reflecting the value of property to its owner.”); see also Fee, supra, at 793 (explaining 
that “some business owners, like homeowners, [also] become personally attached to 
their business property in ways that the market . . . do[es] not value”). 
 204 Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
957, 964. 
 205 Id. at 963. 
 206 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 
992 (1982) (recognizing “society’s traditional connection between one’s home and one’s 
sense of autonomy and personhood”). 
 207 Id. at 959. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
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reimbursement of the homeowner may prove inadequate in 
compensating for his subjective loss.210  
The title insurer has also suffered an economic loss as a 
result of the defective title.211 Given the title insurer’s 
newfound appreciation for the title risks posed by MERS-
mortgaged properties, most title insurers will simply refuse to 
insure them.212 When a title search reveals that the owner of the 
note has not recorded a discharge, the title insurer will inform 
the prospective purchaser of the defect and refrain from issuing 
a policy.213 To the extent that MERS and its members cannot 
produce documentation with respect to the note, the underlying 
properties will begin to suffer from the problem of clouded 
title.214 Aware of potential defects in the chain of title, title 
insurers will refuse to issue policies on the properties,215 and 
prospective purchasers will be unwilling to bear the risks of 
prior claimants.216 Accordingly, they will seek to purchase 
property from another homeowner, and the initial borrower will 
be unable to alienate his property.217 This will have significant 
adverse consequences for property owners and for the real estate 
  
 210 See id. (“[I]f a wedding ring is stolen from a jeweler, insurance proceeds 
can reimburse the jeweler, but if a wedding ring is stolen from a loving wearer, the 
price of a replacement will not restore the status quo—perhaps no amount of money 
can do so.”). 
 211 See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.  
 212 Some title insurers have taken this position in the past as a result of 
lender document irregularities. See David Streitfeld, Company Stops Insuring Titles in 
Chase Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/ 
business/economy/03foreclose.html (“Old Republic National Title Insurance[] told its 
agents Friday that it would not write policies on foreclosed Chase properties until ‘the 
objectionable issues have been resolved,’ according to a memorandum sent out by the 
firm’s underwriting department.”). 
 213 See generally 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 93.05(b) 
(surveying the title insurer’s “duty to search title and report adverse matters”). 
 214 See 65 AM. JUR. 2D Quieting Title § 13 (2011). 
 215 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.  
 216 See 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, supra note 10, § 1.2 (“Purchasers of real property 
expect to be able to build businesses, establish homes, or otherwise improve their 
properties without the risk of having to begin again in another location because 
someone appears with a superior claim to the title. Purchasers want assurance that the 
title is good before they invest money, time, and care, not damages from the grantor 
when the title proves to be defective.”). 
 217 In this regard, it is worth noting the moral hazard concerns that this 
situation creates. If the borrower has a firm enough belief in the defunct status of his 
mortgage note—particularly where the borrower is unable to sell his property—he may 
be willing to cease payments on his mortgage altogether, betting on the fact that his 
lender cannot produce the note in order to pursue foreclosure proceedings. See 
Ketcham, supra note 111, at 36 (suggesting that current uncertainty surrounding 
MERS is “an opportunity to be embraced”). This particular danger arises in 
jurisdictions that require the lender to prove ownership of the note prior to foreclosure. 
See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 537 (App. Div. 2011). 
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market generally.218 If purchasers will not bear the risks of 
defective title and title insurers will not write policies on the 
affected properties, buyers and sellers will become stuck as their 
property loses its alienability. Given that MERS holds an 
estimated 65 million mortgages,219 or approximately 60 percent 
of mortgages nationwide,220 this could have a significant impact 
on the country’s real estate market.  
B. Where MERS Can Properly Discharge the Mortgage as 
Agent 
However, if courts find that MERS has authority to act 
as agent for the original lender and the lender’s assigns,221 
many of the problems for subsequent purchasers may disappear. 
A central principle of agency law is that a principal is “bound by 
the acts of its agent.”222 Accordingly, if courts accept MERS’s 
authority to act as agent for lenders, those lenders would be 
bound by MERS’s discharges to borrowers and would be 
prevented from bringing any claims against the property.223 
Where MERS has discharged the mortgage but the note owner 
fails to receive the proper funds, the remedy is no longer against 
the property but instead is against MERS as the note owner’s 
fiduciary.224 This solution alleviates any issues for subsequent 
purchasers since they would now be entitled to rely on MERS’s 
discharge225 and the note owner’s privity to that transaction.226 
As a result, agency theory removes the cloud on title for owners 
  
 218 See 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, supra note 10, § 1.2 (“Stability of land titles is 
critical not only to individual property owners, but also to society as a whole.”). 
 219 Dennis & Cha, Foreclosure Chaos, supra note 2. 
 220 See Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 539.  
 221 See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Pietranico, 928 N.Y.S.2d 818, 
829 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
 222 Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 590 (7th Cir. 1987); see 2A N.Y. JUR. 
2D Agency § 291 (2009) (“A principal is liable on contracts entered into on its behalf by 
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of MERS-mortgaged properties and breathes liquidity back into 
the real estate market.227  
CONCLUSION 
The MERS system could have dire effects on subsequent 
purchasers of MERS-mortgaged properties. Given the potential 
for widespread documentation errors and the fact that courts 
may refuse MERS’s authority to discharge a mortgage without 
proof of the note, subsequent purchasers could be at risk of 
surprise foreclosures against their property—despite their 
timely mortgage payments. This would have severe effects on 
the real estate market and on homeowners’ ability to alienate 
their property. No title bearing MERS’s name would be certain.  
Nevertheless, courts possess the ability to sidestep these 
problems. If courts recognize MERS’s authority to act as agent 
for its members, they can achieve more desirable outcomes. In 
particular, this solution would alleviate the risks that 
subsequent purchasers otherwise face when acquiring MERS-
mortgaged properties. It would also remove the cloud from 
homeowners’ title. Perhaps most importantly, it would hold 
MERS accountable for its documentation errors and force the 
company to internalize the cost of its own mistakes.  
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